I don't know Kevin Ashton, a co-founder of the Auto ID Labs at MIT, but I have heard him speak several times and read a number of opinion pieces he has written on RFID topics. He is a good, knowledgeable and passionate speaker/writer on RFID.

But his recent column on the RFID Journal site, pointed out to us by our friends at RetailWire, left me and some others scratching our heads a bit.

Ashton's column was called "Wal-Mart was Right" on RFID, despite the general confusion and failure with regard to the Wal-Mart program to this point in time.

What is confusing is the three factors Ashton cites as the general assumptions/myths about why Wal-Mart's program didn't pan out as expected, each of which he argues is untrue:

Myth 1: There’s no business case for Wal-Mart’s suppliers because they have to pay for the RFID tags, which are expensive. Ashton said there was no business case for Wal-Mart if there isn't for suppliers, and that suppliers like P&G were using RFID first.

Myth 2: Suppliers didn't have time to get ready for tagging requirements.

Myth 3: RFID doesn't work well enough yet.

This is odd to me.

Let's take the easiest first. I have never heard anyone say, with regard to #2, that the problem was that suppliers didn't have enough time. They had plenty of time.

On number 3, I think EPC RFID works pretty well today, and probably good enough if the value prop was strong, but still with some room to go. But the comments I have seen and in private discussions always heard that the probem was with linking performance with cost. Never performance stand alone. But at these costs, it did need to work perfectly to be justified, if then. But imperfect performance made justification much harder.

So, let's go to #1, the main point of contention, it seems to me. With all due respect, I simply disagree. As I wrote in RetailWire: "Wal-Mart unquestionably tried to push the technology way in advance of CPG customers wanting it or being ready to justify and absorb the cost--this part of the discussion doesn't even make sense to me. P&G and others were experimenting, but could not drive value without a reader network at the retailers. Most importantly, P&G said from the early stages that RFID made sense for some products (Advantaged, they called them, and they were high value and or promotional displays), but not for most/other SKUs yet.

I added: "Walmart totally failed to discriminate. Its mandate required suppliers to tag everything at the case level, at tremendous cost and--as it turns out now--to no purpose, as the program folded. Its competitor, Tesco in the UK, took a much more strategic approach, working with specific suppliers/SKUs where it thought it could drive value for both parties, but even that effort, from all I can tell, seems to have stalled."

Nikki Baird from Retail Systems Research added: "I take exception with the three assumptions that Ashton is using. These are not the ones that I've heard come up in complaints from both manufacturers and other retailers...Tagging at the case level benefits only one company in that scenario, the company that has the volume that requires it to replenish at the case level to the shelf. And that company is Walmart."

I believe Ashton and Wal-Mart's vision is ultimately the right and winning one. But as I've written before, Wal-Mart's original program as structured was doomed to fail for many reasons that should seem obvious now, and not at all the ones Ashton cites.

So let's not re-write the history.

I’d love your thoughts on this.