In part 1 of this article series, we identified and expanded upon the vulnerability of cross-border security with respect to commercial operations at the southern US borders and the passage of imported and exported products by trucks from Mexico. (See The Southern Border and its Commercial Traffic - A Fundamental Weakness in US Security.)

Let’s now attempt to discover:

 

WHY DHS, CBP, AND ICE HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THE PROCESS

 

Having lived on the Mexican border, worked extensively on border crossing issues, and testified in the U.S. Senate and House and in the Texas House, I can say with absolute certitude that CBP is aware of the issue.  Even ICE is aware of the vulnerabilities posed by cross- border trailer and container movement.  In fact, in 2009, ICE made a video in Laredo, Texas depicting the ease of bypassing the required seals used on containers and trailers that enter through our ports.  

I have a copy of that video, but it seems to have not garnered the attention of those in DHS, nor those on the House and Senate Homeland Security Committees.  In fact, I have been told by CBP in Laredo, Texas that there is nothing it can do, and it is a matter for the U.S. Department of State and the Administration to confront.  According to CBP, it's a political issue --- and I agree with CBP. 

 

Unfortunately, this "political issue" is a genuine security concern for all of us, especially those living in U.S. port cities along the border.  It is a political issue far above the level of CBP.  Why, especially now with Congress knowing that there are terrorists using Mexico for entry into the United States, is there no ostensible interest from Congress or the Administration, especially when the border is becoming even more dangerous? 

 

ROLE OF THE MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS

 

It is undeniable that the Mexican drug cartels are a serious issue not only for Mexico but  for the United States as well.  It is also undeniable that the Mexican Customs Brokers operate as a business cartel by controlling the commercial crossings at our southern border.  Is it possible that there is cooperation between the Mexican Customs Brokers and the Mexican drug cartels?  So far there is no evidence available to the public of any such cooperation. 

It makes sense, however, especially to this former FBI and OSI agent, that there is or could be a relationship. I have been told about interference by one drug cartel in certain high-valued shipments, and we know about other drug cartels putting drugs into trailers bound for the United States.  Additionally, my own intelligence gathering of drug cartel activities indicates that there are at least three Middle Eastern entities now connected to the cartels in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, which is directly across from Laredo, Texas.  I have imparted that information, among other intelligence, to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and received a "thank you" from them.  I also passed it along to CBP, with no response. 

 

Is there a nexus between the apparently uncontrollable Mexican Customs Brokers and the apparently uncontrollable drug cartels?  I do not know as of the time of this writing, but here is the problem: The Mexican Customs Brokers are not willing to change their business practices.  Why would they?  Their practices are tantamount to a "pay first, cash-only” business, but their practices are the reason for the drop lots, the use of drayage, and the use of many unregulated U.S. freight forwarders.  The United States knows very little, if anything, about the background of these businessmen. 

The Mexican Customs Brokers also are not part of our C-TPAT program, so we don't know much about their security measures, if any, or about their business partners or business relationships.  However, C-TPAT allows Mexican manufacturers and motor carriers to participate in the C-TPAT program and even be audited to insure C-TPAT compliance.   Finally, while it is a foreign seaport program, it is also important to recognize that Mexico is not part of the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI) Program, even though they are a NAFTA partner.  Our other NAFTA partner, Canada, is a member and has developed its own supply chain security program call Partners in Protection (PIP) that, along with C-TPAT, is mutually recognized by both the United States and Canada.

 

One could reasonably conclude that the drug cartels may be using and possibly promoting the current illegal alien crossing furor to divert attention from their main movement of guns, money, drugs, and terrorists that are allowed to cross both ways due to a Mexican-controlled commercial system, using a massive number of container and trailer crossings that could serve as the most efficient, effective and safe means of continuing the flow necessary to sustain them.   While this presently cannot be shown, it is difficult to believe that the cartels, as I learned recently, are only bringing in munitions hidden in foul-smelling cars, which are prepared by deliberate applications of garbage and worse, so that Customs and Aduana inspectors make only a cursory examination, if any at all. 

 

CONCLUSION

 

A simple example illustrates my contention. Recently, an inbound container passed through the southern border into the United States.   At its destination in the interior of the United States, it was opened, and the U.S. firm discovered a “plastic jug of urine, a plastic bag of urine, a backpack, a can of sardines (unopened), a hat, a fanny pack and a white tank top.” 

Who had entered the country?  What was their purpose?  What if there had been a bomb instead of people?  The real threat of terrorism, drugs, or illegals in commercial conveyances crossing the southern border will not be solved by ACE, the e-manifest, or C-TPAT.   The need for a comprehensive reform in southern border-crossing practices and a change in commercial culture are essential.   Security begins at “stuffing” at origin and must be maintained through unloading at destination.

 

The current operating and institutional crossing environment along the southern border is inefficient, expensive, and above all presents a serious security risk and vulnerability that can only be fixed by those above the level of CBP.  Only high-level Administrative action, likely through the coordinated efforts of the U.S. Department of State, the Trade Representative’s Office, and DHS can fundamentally change the current system and improve our security.  Until this is done, it is only a matter of time...